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Schneider: State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates: A Re

Editor's note: The comment below is a brief critique of an article
by Professor Jerry Beatty of Simpson College which recently appeared
in this Review. Professor Beatty's rebuttal follows immediately.
STATE COURT EVASION OF UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT MANDATES: A RECONSIDERATION
OF THE EVIDENCE
RONALD SCHNEIDER*
INTRODUCTION

In a recent issue this journal published an article by Professor Jerry
Beatty' in which the author "examine[d] the litigation in state courts
."I As Beatty notes,
subsequent to a remand by the Supreme Court ..
it has been nearly 20 years since such a study has appeared and his
findings are quite intriguing. He reports eight cases of true evasion3 and
ten instances of "quasi-evasion. ' This is a significant increase over the
number of such occurrences in previous decades5 and should be very
troubling to those concerned with the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.
Professor Beatty has undoubtedly produced a timely and provocative article. However, he claims much more for it. By examining the
"litigation in state cases following Supreme Court remands" he purports "to determine the magnitude of state court evasion of Court mandates. ' This he cannot do. Examining the percentage of state court
evasions of Supreme Court mandates in cases remanded to the states
does exactly that and no more. Such a study is admirable but it is
incorrect to claim that by this method one has uncovered "the extent
to which state courts use their discretion in a manner inconsistent with
the Court's mandates." 7 This definition of evasion is unrealistically re*

Graduate student in political science, University of Southern California.

1. Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates During the Last
Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U.L. REV. 260 (1972).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 263.
4. Id.
5. Only four such instances are found in the 1930's and just two in the following decade.
Note, Final Disposition of State Court Decisions Reversed and Remanded by the Supreme
Court, October Term, 1931, to October Term, 1940, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1942); Note, Evasion
of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded to State Courts Since 1941, 67 HARV. L. REV.
1251 (1954).
6. Beatty, supra note 1, at 285.
7. Id. at 260.
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stricted. It uncovers only the smallest fraction of evasions' and leads to
a grossly distorted picture as to the true degree of state court evasions.'
The scope of the problem can only be appreciated by an examination
of the various means by which state courts avoid the effect of Supreme
Court mandates.
METHODS OF EVASION

No study has yet been published which investigates the dimensions
of the problem systematically and thoroughly. There are, however, a
number of case studies which analyze the responses of state courts to
particular rulings of the Supreme Court. The findings of these works
lead one to conclude that "[f]ar more frequently than is generally acknowledged. . . the state courts either ignore the Supreme Court ruling
or evade it ..
"..",10
The studies indicate that the state courts often
ignore, repudiate or narrowly construe Supreme Court decisions.
Ignoring the Mandate
Ignoring a Supreme Court decision is perhaps the easiest way to
mitigate its effects. In a study of southern state supreme court decisions
in the area of civil rights, Kenneth Vines notes that "[in about half of
the cases the decisions cited no precedents from federal courts bearing
on civil rights."" Similarly, in examining the impact of the Supreme
Court ruling in Zorach v. Clauson12 (which validated early release from
public school for religious instruction), Frank Sorauf reports "several
instances where the Zorach decision has, surprisingly, been ignored
when directly relevant .
Stephen Wasby has explored the influence on the Oregon state
8. Under Beatty's definition it is not considered evasive if state courts not directly involved
in the litigation disregard the rulings of the Supreme Court. For example, if a case on appeal to
the United States Supreme Court from California is reversed and remanded to that state for final
disposition, and California and 20 other states evade the ruling, the total number of evasions
(according to Beatty's definition) is one.
9. One writer finds that "[miore significant than the state judges' treatment of cases remanded to them is their application and interpretation of doctrines announced by the Supreme
Court which are supposed to bind all judges in future cases." J.PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 60 (1954).
J. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 60 (1954).
10. H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 218 (2d ed. 1972).
It. Vines, Southern State Supreme Courts and Race Relations, 18 WEST. POL. Q. 5, 16
(1965).
12. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
13. Sorauf, Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision, 53 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 777, 790 (1959).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol7/iss2/3

1973]

Schneider: State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates: A Re
STATE COURT EVASION

courts of the Court's holdings in Everson v. Board of Education" and
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education" (which cases allowed
state benefits to parochial school students). " He found that the Oregon
Supreme Court has avoided the thrust of these rulings by acting "as if
the U.S. Supreme Court cases didn't exist."' 7 Similarly, in a study of
responses of eight courts to the Supreme Court decision in Mapp v.
Ohio'8 (which excluded illegally seized evidence from the courtroom),
David Manwaring finds that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals "has
shown a marked reluctance to cite either Mapp or the other federal
precedents .... ,
The cases noted above seem to be far from exceptional. One author
has attempted to investigate systematically the frequency with which
appellate courts cite each other.2 0 While not explicitly addressing the
matter under discussion here, his findings provide some indication of the
extent to which the Supreme Court is ignored. Stuart Nagel examined
all cases covered in Shepard's Citations for the years 1955-59. A recalculation of his figures reveals that, out of 2,541 state court citations,
federal courts are cited only 165 times (6.5 percent).2 '
Repudiation
State courts will occasionally recognize the existence of a federal
precedent only to repudiate it. Probably the most famous example of
this phenomenon is Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee,2 in which the
state court refused to honor a Supreme Court order invalidating that
state's confiscation of land belonging to an alien enemy. Repudiation,
however, is by no means exclusively an historical phenomenon. In Kent
v. United States 3 the Supreme Court held that minors have a right to
a hearing with counsel before a juvenile court may waive jurisdiction
over the case. When the Texas legislature subsequently passed a statute
in line with the holding, it was "held unconstitutional by the Texas
court. '2 4 In Minersville School District v. Gobitis2 5 the Court sustained
14. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
16. S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 201 (1970).
17. Id.
18. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19. Manwaring, The Impact of Mapp v. Ohio, in THE SUPREME COURT AS POLICY-MAKER
24 (D. Everson ed. 1968).
20. Nagel, Socionietric Relations Among American Courts, 43 Sw. Soc. Scl. Q. 136 (1962).
21.

Id. at 138.

22.
23.
24.
25.

II U.S. (7 Cranch) 684 (1813).
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
WASBY, supra note 16, at 154.
310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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the right of states to require mandatory flag salutes. Manwaring found,
however, that three state courts "directly repudiated the Gobitis precedent."" The same author found that three states had also repudiated the
Mapp decision.2
Narrow Construction
State courts often evade Supreme Court rulings by interpreting the
decision very narrowly or by finding that the case before them is distinguishable from the relevant High Court ruling. In Betts v. Brady,2 for
example,
the Court ruled that the defendants in noncapital cases were
entitled to state-appointed counsel if special circumstances
were present making it impossible for the defendant to represent himself adequately. However, in only 11 out of 139 state
appellate cases concerning this issue were special circumstances found.2 9
In reference to another decision, Edward Beiser reports that although
"[i]t was generally understood that Baker v. Carr required lower courts
to deal with apportionment cases. . . six of the nineteen state supreme
courts 'ducked' apportionment questions .... ,,30
Other decisions have been emasculated in the same manner. The
Court's ruling in Kent v. United StatesM' has been distinguished at least
three times.3 2 In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona33 the Supreme Court held that a criminal suspect must be informed of his constitutional rights before being questioned. However, "there have been a
number of instances" where the decision was held inapplicable to cases
before the state courts.34 Another author points out that one state has
26. D. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR 193 (1962).
"
27. A New Jersey court stated that 'in searching for guiding authority we are of course
led principally to federal cases. This is not to acknowledge their binding efficacy.'" Manwaring,
supra note 19, at 9. In California the courts "doggedly cited Mapp only to hold it irrelevant." Id.
at 14. Finally, the Texas court "showed a marked reluctance to acknowledge itself to be bound by
[Mappl ... ."Id. at 24.
28. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
29. Levine & Becker, Toward and Beyond a Theory of Supreme Court Impact, 13 AM.
BEHAV. SCi. 561, 562 (1970).
30. Beiser, A Comparative Analysis of State and FederalJudicialBehavior: The Reapportionment Cases, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 788, 793 (1968).
31. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
32. WASBY, supra note 16, at 154.
33. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
34. WASBY, supra note 16, at 158.
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tacitly disobeyed the mandate of Miranda by "narrow or nonapplication .".
In Tumey v. Ohio" the Supreme Court explicitly found that the
practice of judicial officers receiving remuneration from fines imposed
on defendants deprived defendants of due process. However, Kenneth
Vandlandingham reports that, although subsequent to the Tumey decision
attempts have been made to invalidate convictions in justice
courts where it appeared that justices were financially interested in returning convictions, the majority of such efforts have
proved unscccessful . . .because most state supreme courts
hold that circumstances present in such cases are unlike those
37
of the Tumey case.
Turning again to the Mapp decision, Manwaring finds that the
courts in Michigan, New Jersey, Texas, Pennsylvania, and New York
have distinguished the case away28 The author notes that in its objective
to make federal search and seizure precedents binding on the
state courts, the Court met with only partial and very spotty
success. . . . Aside from the basic changeover to the exclusionary rule, no state changed its behavior . . .3
CONCLUSION

As the above survey indicates, many state courts manage to circumvent United States Supreme Court mandates. Even though no studies to date have realistically measured the extent to which state courts
evade such decisions, the fragmentary evidence available indicates that
the practice is rather widespread. 0 Indeed, it may well be the rule rather
than the exception. It appears, therefore, that Professor Beatty's conclu''4
sion that "most state courts have an admirable record of compliance 1
is unfounded.
35. Note, Gideon, Escobedo, Miranda: Begrudging Acceptance of the United States Supreme Court's Mandates, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 346, 359 (1968).
36. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
37. Vanlandingham, Pecuniary Interest ofJustices of the Peace in Kentucky: The Aftermath
of Tumey v. Ohio, 45 Ky. L. J. 609 (1957).
38. Manwaring, supra note 19, at 9, 23, 24.
39. Id. at 24.
40. For additional examples see Murphy, Lower-Court Checks on Supreme Court Power,
53 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1017 (1959); Paulson, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the
States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950); Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 345 (1930); Weisberg, Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions Involving Multiple
Questions, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 764 (1947).

41.

Beatty, supra note I, at 284.
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